This article is an attempt to explore how ǧihādī authors make use of the Sunni tradition to bolster their case. Islamicists have rarely embarked on such a discussion, given the tendency to a priori chastise extremist authors for their untenable misrepresentation of Islam. Similarly, ǧihādī arguments are frequently tossed aside as an already familiar rehashing of an insignificant, isolated stream of thought that stretches directly from Ibn Taimīya via Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb to Saiyid Quṭb. In revisiting this claim, I employ a close reading of the crucial ǧihādī manual al-ʿUmda fī iʿdād al-ʿudda li-lǧihād fī sabīl Allāh (The Essential Guide of Preparation for ǧihād on the Path of God), written in the mid-1980s in the context of Afghanistan by an influential ideologue who is widely known as Dr. Faḍl. After presenting and evaluating a selection of the religious sources and authorities on which the author draws, the article enters into a discussion of his political thought. I argue that Dr. Faḍl makes a convincing case for a political project in the camps that is deeply embedded within the Sunni tradition. Reading Ibn Taimīya faithfully, Dr. Fadl does not turn him in into a proponent of violence against the ruler. Rather, the author sticks to the profound quietism the Damascene scholar is known for, thereby questioning supposedly established, clearcut paths of reception.
make of the abhorrence al-Ǧ uwainī (d. 478/1085) displays regarding instrumental-rational conceptions of law among the Ḥanafīs?
14
Shall we dismiss the significance and reality of inter-maḏhab riots simply as disguised political conflicts?
15
Maybe the undeniable phenomenon of plurality has little to do with a basic consensus holding that opinions and convictions were seen as interchangeable and disagreements regarded as a mere blessing. Rather, it might be fruitful to take into consideration that medieval scholars seldom had the necessary compelling force at hand to push through a certain interpretation of doctrine.
16 Jonathan Berkey in his study on popular preaching holds that "many of the medieval ulama would have preferred a more static vision and experience of their faith". Such an attitude gave rise to the growing role of legal compendia (muḫtaṣar) which encouraged unanimity within each school, sharpening its boundaries, and increased the salience of bidʿa-related charges.
17 Similarly, we also have to be careful in claiming that contemporary extremist thinkers can only adduce maverick authorities. Khaled Abou El Fadl has brought to light a whole stream of thinking about political rebellion (aḥkām al-buġāh) which explicitly made room for legitimate upheavals against the ruler. As long as rebels could claim to be more than highwaymen (ḥirāba) but adopted a system of belief or interpretation (taʾwīl), selected a leader and acted as a cohesive group, aš-Šāfiʿī was willing to not hold them liable for damage they inflicted on other Muslims. 18 When it came to later jurists, who had absorbed the experience of the Mongol threat, the ultimate question of whether one should rebel against an unjust government was answered with a complex but succinct response summarized in the expression "it depends". This balance-of-evils test manifested itself later when some contemporary scholars deliberately remained ambiguous as to whether the Wahhābī movement could be labeled as buġāh.
19 Khaled Abou El Fadl considers it as significant that jurists, given their preference for stable systems, thought about the right to resist the state and sometimes openly advocated sedition. 20 Werner Schwartz argues along the same lines, calling this non-quietist stream an "alternative Orthodoxie".
21
These general reflections prepare the ground for an essential question the present article intends to raise: What do we actually know about the theological labor that Islamist and ǧihādī authors exert to bolster their position?
22 Is it at all possible to trace the intellectual origins of political visions to which the key thinkers within the ǧihādī camp subscribe? It might make sense to accept their reasoning at face value for analytical purposes without from the outset aiming solely at demonstrating the flaws of their approach or their political naiveté. 23 The way in which we deal with the juridical-theological aspects of radical Islam lacks this impartiality-for many good reasons, to be sure. 24 Yet, by focusing only on a rather "canonical" progression of several influential modern thinkers like Abū 'l-ʿAlā Maudūdī, Saiyid Quṭb and ʿAbd Allāh ʿAzzām, 25 it proved often fairly easy to dismiss such activist reasoning as a modern ideology barely disguised by Islamic garb. Such an argument is often connected with an emphasis on Ibn Taimīya's (d. 718/1328) central role 19) Ibid., 331ff.
20)
Ibid., 18.
21)
Werner Schwartz, Ǧihād unter Muslimen (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1980 
24)
The present study follows in this regard the approach adopted by Heinrich Meier who sets out to read Carl Schmitt's political theology while, first of all, taking him seriously ( 40-47. in ǧihādī thought 26 which was picked up and popularized by the wahhābīya.
27
A systematic study, however, exploring the history of Ibn Taimīya's reception as well as a detailed discussion of the extent to which he in fact dominates extremist thought, is missing in the literature. 28 Con-
26)
Ibn Taimīya is portrayed as the "reference for almost all Arab Islamists from Egypt, to Algeria, to Saudi-Arabia" (Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 120). David Cook conceives his "extreme popularity" as a result of his prestige as a scholar who did not hesitate to attack established Muslim authorities while also delivering harsh judgments on unbelievers and apostates (David Cook stating that it mainly served the justification of ǧihād against Muslims who resist the established political order or refuse to submit to the rules of the šarīʿa. 31 The best-known radical interpretation of Ibn Taimīya was brought forward by the assassins of the Egyptian president Anwar as-Sādāt in their notorious pamphlet al-Ǧihād al-farīḍa al-ġāʾiba (Ǧihād: The Neglected Duty). Consisting of long passages that are taken verbatim from Ibn Taimīya's anti-Mongol fatwās, this text led not only to a renaissance of the Western interest in this multifaceted scholar but to a reductionist portrayal of him as well.
32 It is important of course to keep in mind that Islamist groups in general and resurgent or ǧihādī groups in particular are an essentially modern phenomenon.
33 If this labeling, however, becomes the exclusive focus of our attention, we
29)
Among the authors mentioned in this paper Sivan, Wiktorowicz and Jansen all rely on Peters. 193-198. forgo the opportunity to take a deeper and more careful look at how contemporary ǧihādī thinkers engage the religious tradition. I suggest that it is worthwhile to explore how they choose from among classical and medieval authorities those scholars on whom they intend to build their argument and in which way the longstanding exegetical traditions of fiqh and kalām are reflected in modern radical tracts.
34

A Surgeon's Unrivaled ǧihādī Legacy
More specifically, I am interested in analyzing how scholarly authorities from the formative, middle and modern period 35 are used in ǧihādī discourse. I would like to pursue this task in relation to the important ǧihād manual al-ʿUmda fī iʿdād al-ʿudda li-l-ǧihād fī sabīl Allāh (The Essential Guide of Preparation for ǧihād in the Path of God), completed in 1988. Relying on a close reading of the treatise, I shall provide a selection from the classical and modern authorities that are cited, and explore how the author employs them to further his cause and to advance his particular interpretation. When I use the term ʿulamāʾ, I apply it in a very broad sense that refers to scholars of ḥadīṯ as well as fiqh, a rather loosely defined scholarly elite that has enjoyed institutionalized religious education (see Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Religion and Politics under the Early ʿAbbāsids: The Emergence of the Proto-Sunnī Elite (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 3). 
36)
For a more comprehensive discussion of even minor authors mentioned in al-ʿUmda, compare Fuchs, Proper Signposts for the Camp. The field of Islamic studies is in general reluctant to embrace literary theory or reception theory to explore intertextual connections. Even a study as recent as Alexander Knysh's Ibn ʿArabi in the Later Islamic Tradition (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999) can simply declare that it aims at "tracing the fate of his legacy through the centuries" by juxtaposing sympathetic and polemical accounts in order to discover the "real" Ibn al-ʿArabī (ibid., 21 
45)
Dr. Faḍl was released from prison in the fall of 2012. He used his newly found freedom to pronounce in several TV appearances takfīr of those who participated in Egypt's postMubarak political process. Additionally, his Facebook page recently announced the release of a book which promises to reveal the "secrets" about al-Qāʿida and its involvement with international drug cartels and foreign governments in the planning of 9/11. I am thankful to Cole Bunzel for sharing these information with me.
46)
Camille Tawil, Brothers in Arms: The Story of Al-Qa'ida and the Arab Jihadists (London: Saqi, 2010), 38.
47)
Lohlker, Dschihadismus, 61.
Rashwan states that the work "was considered the most dangerous book in circulation during the savage conflict between the Egyptian regime and the Jihad during the 1990s". Occasionally its mere possession would lead to executions. 48 The Militant Ideology Atlas, monitoring the downloads from www.tawhed.ws, concludes that al-ʿUmda is the second most downloaded text dealing with ǧihād on the site.
49
Tradition Reclaimed
The argument that proponents of extremist Islam, trying as hard as they do to position themselves squarely within the Sunni mainstream, should only adopt a very narrow view on the religious tradition appears somewhat self-contradictory. I would, therefore, like to expand on observations made inter alia by Gilles Kepel and Gudrun Krämer. Both scholars found that Islamist activists either entirely discard the Islamic scholarly tradition-or restrict themselves to the works of Ibn Taimīya. The Damascene scholar stands out among his peers who are condemned by these ǧihādī thinkers for their subservience to the rulers and their tailoring of fatwās to suit the sovereigns' un-Islamic interests. This unfortunate development, so this reasoning goes, has plagued Islam ever since the formation of the four schools of law.
50
I suggest also, partly following Daniel Lav, to complicate the straightforward character of the prominent Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb-Saiyid Quṭb connection which ought to be discernible, according to this common argument, in all later radical writings. Such a view does not hold with Dr. Faḍl's treatise from which both writers are largely absent. One could assume of course that it might simply be undesirable to erect a worldview that claims to be the original doctrine of the ahl as-sunna wa-l- argument, expounded so prominently in al-Farīḍa al-ġāʾiba, of the apostate (murtadd; read: the unbelieving ruler) being far worse than someone who has never been a Muslim in the first place (al-kāfir al-aṣlī).
54
It is important to realize, too, that the Islamic political theories on which Dr. Faḍl draws leave him much room to maneuver. This is due to the specific feature of many writings in this field not to spell out clearly legal procedures like the mechanisms of deposing a caliph. Instead, they operate with rather vague terms like ahl al-ḥall wa-l-ʿaqd (the people of loosing and binding).
55 Thus, it proves fairly easy for Dr. Faḍl to fill the silence or deliberate ambiguity of classical texts with his own position without betraying their original intent. He fuses this classical political thought with a loose formal definition of the state that fits neatly with equally functional definitions as developed by Ibn Taimīya.
56 He can, overall, rely on a powerful minority stream of political activism. In this regard his method resembles that of the representatives of the Christian "radical orthodoxy" movement who seek to connect themselves to a conception of patristics that was buried under the weight of enlightenment and secularization.
57 His combination of all these different sources makes Dr. Faḍl's arguments quite convincing in certain passages of al-ʿUmda. He is anything but an uneducated firebrand, to be sure: His last book, the Waṯīqat at-taršīd, was published in cooperation with a group of al-Azhar dignitaries who approved it as 54) This view is held, for example, by the salafī ǧihādī Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī. See Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi, 71. 55) Muhammad Qasim Zaman points out that both in the debate over the qualifications, as well as over the very identity of this group there is "much that remains elusive in classical juristic discussions […] . Yet the guiding assumption in such discussions seems to be that those comprising this category stand out by virtue of their stature and suitability and that their identity would, in fact, be unmistakable to all concerned." See Muhammad Qasim Zaman "Ahl al-ḥall wa-l-ʿaqd", in EI being in accordance with "official" Islamic thought. 58 Yet, given all these scholarly credentials, Dr. Faḍl's departure from classical theory becomes, for the same reason, more than obvious in critical junctures of the argument: his efforts to cast ǧihād as the umma's necessary response are far less developed than his deliberations on the nuances of obedience every Muslim leader deserves. Before we take a closer look at how al-ʿUmda treats classical authorities, a brief discussion of the general purpose, structure and underlying worldview of the work is necessary.
The Structure of al-ʿUmda
Dr. Faḍl explains in the introduction that he aims at answering the question of how Muslims can fulfill the duty of ǧihād and prepare themselves for it despite their current (political) weakness and fragmentation (al-ḥāl min aḍ-ḍaʿf wa-t-tafarruq).
59
Even though the challenge of inculcating correct belief receives its fair share, 60 his discussion mainly revolves around governance in accordance with the šarīʿa (as-siyāsa aš-šarʿīya), the backbone of the treatise (ṣulb ar-risāla).
61 He has written al-ʿUmda especially for the brothers in the camp who asked him about the proper Muslim conduct in such an environment 62 and promises to provide answers regarding the most dangerous attacks and claimsstemming from the midst of the umma-which the muǧāhidūn have to face. The brothers could fall prey to false claims like ǧihād being only 58) See the newspaper al-Miṣrīyūn, 15 September 2007.
59)
I have relied for the translation on a version of al-ʿUmda that can be downloaded at http:// www.tawhed.ws/dl?i=f8ro5d45, accessed 31 October 2012. In the process of working with the text, I was able to check this version against a printed edition available at Princeton University Library that was published in 1999 by Dār al-Bayāriq in Amman. Scholars who would like to verify my quotes are kindly requested to contact me, so that I can send them the PDF-file on which my quotations are based. The text on tahwed.ws is only available as a complex word document, which quite likely will be displayed with variances on different computer screens. defensive or an abrogated duty or that Islam is entirely compatible with democracy.
63
By dispelling these perilous seeds of doubt and providing rules of appropriate conduct, Dr. Faḍl attempts to contribute to mutual understanding and peace in the training camps (muʿaskarāt at-tadrīb al-islāmīya). He regards these as nothing less than the nucleus for the common Islamic work (al-ʿamal al-islāmī l-ǧamāʿī) that has yet to be established on a global scale.
64
Dr. Faḍl divides his treatise into five parts of vastly unequal length. The third chapter, al-Imāra, can be considered-along with the fourth, Wāǧibāt amīr al-muʿaskar (The Obligations of the Camp's Military Leader)-as the core of the book: Dr. Faḍl advances religious justifications for setting up an alternative political authority beyond the state and explores its possible scope. He elaborates on the conditions which a political/military leader has to fulfill, his duties, and the circumstances under which one is no longer bound in obedience to him. 65 The author focuses heavily on the requirements leadership imposes on the elite. Dr. Faḍl devotes no less than 247 pages to this topic in the book's fourth chapter. In comparison, only 55 pages in the fifth chapter revolve around Wāǧibāt aʿḍāʾ al-muʿaskar, the obligations of the camp members. 66 If we switch from the macro level of al-ʿUmda to the way Dr. Faḍl arranges each chapter, we find that he clearly intends to couch his views into the forms of traditional religious reasoning. Resembling the structure of fatwā collections, he takes up (hypothetical) questions that are intended to clarify his viewpoints. In his answers, Dr. Faḍl never hides behind the smokescreen of other authorities. He always spells out his personal opinion with great confidence, introducing it over 220 63) Ibid., 254. 64) Ibid., 5. It might be possible to view the camps in Afghanistan as the finally fulfilled ambition of efforts in the 1970 by a group which became known as at-Takfīr wa-l-Ḥiǧra (Excommunication and Emigration) to erect such a parallel world in apartments around Cairo. See Gilles Kepel, The Roots of Radical Islam, 77f. and 90f. 65) It is permissible to use only the masculine form when talking about authority since women do not play a major role in the treatise. With regard to ǧihād they are only to learn the necessary skills to defend their homes in the case of an attack (al-ʿUmda, 25f.). Dr. Faḍl dismisses views which would like to deny women even this role. As we will see later on, this approach fits with his overall effort to present himself as a middle-of-the-road thinker (ibid., 101). 66) Ibid., times in al-ʿUmda with the statements "I say", "we say" or "I think that".
67 This boldness is not per se out of the scope of fatwā-style reasoning since the muftī can express his position in a "caractère absolument objectif ".
68
The reverse side of Dr. Faḍl's strong conviction regarding the "Islam"-conformity of his own positions is expressed by his unbridled attacks on opinions he deems unacceptable. In philosophical and theological scholastic treatises, positive arguments for a given view are often followed by a series of šubuhāt (sing. šubha), counter-arguments by opponents, and their specific refutations.
69 This is exactly the way in which Dr. Faḍl's sections of radd are structured.
70 He quotes the opponent he intends to refute, usually at length and with proper footnotes, 71 before turning to an elaboration of his own view.
72
The book is held together by an entirely negative account Dr. Faḍl gives of the situation of Muslims today. Everything the Prophet issued warnings about is flourishing: excess in asceticism, the separation of politics and religion and outward display of foreign manners.
73 The unbelievers rule, they imprison "Muslims", they torture, defile women and employ a very effective strategy which might be termed "no bread but circuses".
74 Carrying weapons is restricted to the cronies of the rulers. They try to drive a deadly wedge between the Muslim population 67) Qultu appears in al-ʿUmda 191 times, naḥnu naqūlu 22 times and arāhu seven times. Ibid ., 29. The rulers deliberately worsen the economic situation, thus distracting the population from ǧihād, by turning their existence into a daily struggle for basic commodities at large and the Islamic activists (al-mutamassikīn bi-dīnihim) in particular in order to easily finish off the latter. The activists have to reverse this process, they have to isolate the tyrants (aṭ-ṭawāġīt) from the general public by personal and public religious propaganda (daʿwa) so that the principle of ǧihād no longer remains the conviction of the activists only but is transformed into a common goal.
75 Time is running out for these lofty endeavors. The situation is comparable to the ridda wars after the death of the Prophet and more dangerous for religion than the period of the miḥna. 76 Worst of all, though, is the challenge that the bulk of disseminated religious knowledge does not strive for God's glory but rather is geared towards justifying the anti-Islamic behavior committed by the unbelieving rulers (taṯbīt autād al-kāfirīn).
77 This seems to be a rather straightforward ǧihādī analysis. Yet, the present does not loom large in Dr. Faḍl's world view: there are no references to the ǧihād in Afghanistan which was winding down in 1988 and came to an end with the final Soviet withdrawal one year later, nor do we find any other concrete examples of ǧihād-related activities in the 20 th century retold.
78
In general, the situation of Muslims today resembles the setbacks and precarious circumstances of Islam's beginnings when economic difficulties and persecution ruled supreme. qitālīya) which proclaims itself to be in the right while denouncing the other party which must be fought. Yet, the motives of the Muslims fundamentally diverge since they intend to bring the whole world into submission to God. It was God's plan to separate mankind into believers and unbelievers in order to test them through this mutual hostility. 80 The Muslim umma is a fighting one 81 and ǧihād remains its essential characteristic until they struggle alongside with Jesus against the antiChrist (al-masīḥ ad-daǧǧāl).
82 Following Ibn Taimīya, Dr. Faḍl stresses that ǧihād is the best voluntary deed and one of the best sacrifices for God. 83 Yet, not everybody has to go out into battle. Even when ǧihād has become an individual obligation (farḍ ʿain), a portion of the umma, the ṭāʾifa manṣūra (the victorious group), an elite segment within alfirqa an-nāǧiya, 84 can take up the responsibility to do the actual fighting. 85 This activist stance makes it clear that the author grants human beings far-reaching leverage over their actions and endows them with responsibility. Dr Within the important ǧihādī debate about who should be the primary target, Dr. Faḍl clearly sides with al-Farīḍa al-ġāʾiba and identifies the near enemy as the most pressing concern.
88 As mentioned earlier, Dr. Faḍl does not subscribe to al-Fārīḍa's sharp distinction between the murtadd and al-kāfir al-aṣlī. 89 For Dr. Faḍl, this differentiation is not more than a secondary criterion (waṣf ṯānawī). Only the rejection of God's commands itself matters: The šarīʿa does not distinguish between foreign and domestic unbelievers. Such a way of thinking would resemble the argument that locally produced wine is more harmful than imported alcoholic beverages.
90 Whom to fight first is not a question of a general classification of kufr but rather determined by political urgency (wa-laisa l-maqṣad mimmā sabaqa bayān at-tartīb bal bayān al-ahammīya).
91
Dr. Faḍl's Approach to Religious Sources
Dr. Faḍl admonishes his audience to accept only statements that have a clear basis in the Qurʾān, the sunna, and analogy (qiyās). Especially the latter becomes an important tool for him in applying ḥadīṯ to modern circumstances. He does not accept, however, consensus (iǧmāʿ) in an unqualified way as a further source of law. One might speculate that this has to do with the bleak picture the ʿulamāʾ provide in the modern world: Dr 
90)
Ibid., 288. 91) Ibid., 304.
92)
We will take a closer look at Dr. Faḍl's political views below. At this point, I would only like to raise the possibility that his adoption of a skeptical attitude towards iǧmāʿ might not only be due to its legal consequences but maybe also because of more far-reaching, political implications as well. Dr. Faḍl's attempts to anchor the authority of the camp commander and the ruler in an absolute power of decision-making. Since iǧmāʿ for modernist thinkers like Rašīd Riḍā or Muḥammad Iqbāl became an arena of a collective iǧtihād, carried out by a Muslim parliament, he might be careful to forestall any such interpretations by excluding the concept from the discourse (see Muhammad Qasim Zaman, "Consensus and Religious seemingly unequivocal in rejecting the schools of law by stating that man should only follow God. Yet, he relies on an alleged consensus several times in his treatise. He adduces, for example, the opinions of jurists who belong to different schools of law when arguing that judges not appointed by a ruler can dispense justice, too. 93 We can distill Dr. Faḍl's self-perception as a writer who obviously uses his religious sources properly if we consider the way he attacks his opponents. It is especially the Jordanian salafī scholar ʿAlī b. Ḥasan al-Ḥalabī al-Aṯarī whom he accuses of a very selective reading of Ibn Taimīya. Such an approach, he maintains, has nothing to do with good scholarly work (laisa min al-amāna al-ʿilmīya šaiʾ). 
Qurʾān
Before turning to medieval and modern authorities whom Dr. Faḍl cites, we should briefly review his use of Qurʾān and ḥadīṯ as well. We can identify first of all a stress on the necessity of obedience to authorities. The verse Q4:59 "O believers, obey God, and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you" 96 serves as one of the central references for all theoreticians of an Islamic political system.
97
It is, therefore, not surprising that it constitutes Dr. Faḍl's most often quoted passage from the Qurʾān.
98
That he envisions a top-down, elitist conception of society can be inferred from his exegesis of Q4:58, which cautions that the deposits (amānāt) should only be handed over to those to whom they belong. Dr. Faḍl interprets the amānāt as rulership (wilāya) which is assigned to those who are capable (akfāʾ) and possess special knowledge like the ʿulamāʾ.
99 This group of specialists also assumes the role of deciding disputed topics as "those of them whose task it is to investigate would have known the matter" (Q4:83).
100
A second important topic is the encouragement of Muslims to get ready for ǧihād: Q8:60, which urges the believer to prepare "whatever force and strings of horses you can", is cited 15 times.
101 In this context, Dr. Faḍl argues for a strict deed-reward scheme, highlighting human agency: Q42:30, which warns that the afflictions striking man are the result of his sins, is quoted seven times.
102 He also cites a verse that is one of the hallmark themes of all reformers: God will not change the condition of a people "until they change what is in themselves" (Q13:11).
103 Such a transformation can only come about by applying the principle of commanding right and forbidding wrong (Q22:40).
104
The latter duty is tightly connected to ǧihād as a constant sign of distinction for the umma to whom God eventually will grant victory.
105
The case of the "verse of the sword" (Q9:5) is an interesting one: sūra 9, which is set apart by its "martial nature" is the only sūra which does not feature the invocation of God's mercy and is quoted extensively by Dr. Faḍl. Yet, Q9:5, usually considered to be the ǧihād verse par excellence due to its abrogating power, does not receive much attention. 106 This might have to do with a) the conviction that ǧihād, out of political urgency, ought ultimately not be waged against the mušrikūn (as the verse states), but rather against the murtadd rulers in Muslim countries and b) with the fact that ǧihādī authors usually frame the fight in question as purely defensive and hence an individual duty for every Muslim.
107 Another verse the near absence of which rings loud is Q5:44 (man lam yaḥkum bi-mā anzala Allāh).
108 This verse was used by Saiyid Quṭb who interpreted yaḥkum in the sense of "to rule". The Prophet (pbuh) summoned us and we gave him the pledge of allegiance. And he took from us that we pledge to listen and obey in that which is pleasant (manšaṭinā) for us and in that which is repulsive for us and which is easy for us and which is difficult for us and which is in our interest and that we as his people (ahluhu) would not fight the order (al-amr). He said: "Unless you see open kufr for which you have a proof from God." 
(Muslim 4793).
114 The same threat applies to withdrawing from the amīr even an arm's length (al-Buḫārī 7053) or excluding oneself from the fold of the community and not having patience with the leader (alBuḫārī 7054). Separation is only legitimate from heretical groups which are destined for hellfire (al-Buḫārī 7084), otherwise the dictum of the Prophet "who obeyed my amīr has obeyed me (man aṭāʿa amīrī fa-qad aṭāʿanī)" (Muslim 4749) is the overriding concern.
115 The majority of the traditions cited deal with a topic that one would not expect to occupy such a prominent place in a treatise on the preparation for ǧihād: obedience towards the amīr or rather towards (alternative) political authorities. Dr. Faḍl heavily relies on al-Buḫārī 3062 which states that God may even support religion through a wicked man (wa-inna Allāh
la-yuʾaiyidu hāḏā d-dīn bi-r-raǧul al-fāǧir).
116
Laying the groundwork for obedience, Dr. Faḍl repeatedly quotes the ḥadīṯ Abū Dāʾūd 2608 which states that if three people are traveling, they shall appoint one of them as their amīr as his main proof for the possibility to establish political authority when no legimiate Islamic ruler is present.
117 Tightly connected with this possibility to overcome the vacuum of leadership are several ḥadīṯs which all emphasize -at least in Dr. Faḍl's view-that binding contracts between Muslims are valid despite the Prophet's seemingly strict ban on sworn alliances. 118 Dr. Faḍl tries in the course of al-ʿUmda to demonstrate the permissibility of baiʿa, even if such a pledge is not given to a caliph. order to flesh out the actual character of the political system which he envisions, Dr. Faḍl draws on the second Caliph ʿUmar's precedent of consultation when the plague (aṭ-ṭāʿūn) broke out in ʿAmwās (al-Buḫārī 5729). 120 This emphasis on political authority is also reflected in the rest of the cited traditions: 23 of them deal with obedience, whereas we encounter 27 other ḥadīṯs that have a decidedly political content. In contrast, the obligation as well as the regulations pertaining to ǧihād are spelled out in 26 ḥadīṯs. To sum up: two broad lines of thought have come to light in our discussion of Dr. Faḍl's usage of material from the Qurʾān and ḥadīṯ, one of them being ǧihād and its necessities, the other questions that revolve around political authority.
Ḥanbalī Authorities
Despite Dr. Faḍl's declared aversion to the schools of law, it might be useful to nevertheless enter into separate discussions of both Ḥanbalī and non-Ḥanbalī ʿulamāʾ, not only because Ibn Taimīya as a prominent Ḥanbalī plays a distinct role in al-ʿUmda. The Ḥanbalī maḏhab suffers from an extremist image that dates back at least to Ignaz Goldziher who singled out "fanaticism" and "dark priesthood (finsteres Pfaffentum)" as the main features of the school.
121
While this one-sided portrayal was challenged by George Makdisi,
122
it is still upheld in a new form: via Ibn Taimīya, Ibn Qaiyim al-Ǧauzīya and Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, the ḥanbalīya is regularly linked to radical Islam by these torchbearers of the school. I shall, therefore, probe these claims first, before turning my attention to those ʿulamāʾ who are anchored in the other schools as well. 
Ibn Taimīya
Among Ḥanbalī jurists, Ibn Taimīya is without doubt the most often cited author in al-ʿUmda. Dr. Faḍl refers to him 102 times and he is also the first ʿālim mentioned in the book.
123 Reflecting the title of the treatise, it should not surprise us that the essential quote taken from Ibn Taimīya, repeated nine times by Dr. Faḍl, deals with the necessity to prepare oneself for ǧihād even in times of weakness.
124 Such a short statement which is not tied to any context, is, however, the exception rather than the rule. Nearly all other excerpts from Ibn Taimīya are substantially longer: about one third (or 34 quotes) amount from seven lines up to a page. The longest quotation in the whole book is taken from the second anti-Mongol fatwā and elaborates on the necessity to fight even under the banner of a less than ideal amīr.
125
Even though Ibn Taimīya sometimes serves as Dr. Faḍl's first source of information, 126 we also find whole chapters which do not contain any reference to the Damascene Ḥanbalī.
127 There are other cases when Ibn Taimīya is cited while playing only a subordinate role. At times, his views are not used to justify a certain opinion but merely to confirm the position held by another ʿālim. This use of Ibn Taimīya might hint at the fact that Dr. Faḍl either does not regard the Šaiḫ al-Islām as such a towering figure that he would eclipse all other authorities, or that he is eager to distribute the share of the authorities he uses for his religiojuridical reasoning more evenly. Such an approach is discernible regarding the question whether separating oneself from a certain Islamic group 123) Al-ʿUmda, 4. This is, for instance, the case with the discussion revolving around the obligation for ǧihād (ibid., 13) or that God makes use of immoral (fāǧir) people to spread his religion (ibid., 33).
127)
Ibn Taimīya is, for example, entirely absent in the debate on the reduction of the reward (aǧr) a muǧāhid is due to receive in heaven if he also makes earthly gains during his raids (ibid., 15-19).
may constitute an instance of kufr.
128 With regard to the amīr's obligation to consult, Ibn Taimīya's role might be more aptly described as the capstone in the author's argument. His opinion is cited as the final polish after other authorities have debated the topic at length.
129 Ibn Taimīya is, on the other hand, the only author who becomes the subject of a detailed passage which addresses the question of how to interpret him correctly: Dr. Faḍl rebukes the Jordanian salafī scholar al-Ḥalabī for his reading of Ibn Taimīya on the particular subject of baiʿa, thereby allowing us to take a glance at the debates taking place between quietist salafīs and ǧihādī figures like Dr worldly order, neither the ḥaǧǧ nor justice could prevail. Dr. Faḍl goes to great lengths in singling out baiʿa as a binding and effective instrument to guarantee cohesion and order. 136 Ibn Taimīya is consulted to underline that such an oath must be kept at any rate. The last third of quotes taken from Ibn Taimīya's writings are scattered among advice how to treat civilians in war, religious reasoning and legal issues. Dr. Faḍl draws on him in order to make room for human action. The belief in predetermination, for example, cannot serve as an excuse for committing reprehensible deeds.
137
Ibn Taimīya does not feature prominently in demonstrating the permissiveness of waging ǧihād against unbelieving rulers with one notable exception: Dr. Faḍl discusses the objection that the Damascene's fatwās could not apply to al-murtaddūn al-ḥākimūn because the Mongols, unlike them, were a foreign enemy (al-ʿadūw al-aǧnabī). Dr. Faḍl dismisses this notion, claiming that the argument does not stand or fall with Ibn Taimīya. In fact, one can make a convincing case by relying on an independent tradition (naṣṣ mustaqill), the previously-cited ḥadīṯ 7056 in al-Buḫārī. 138 Besides this brief discussion, al-ʿUmda does not contain any argument attached to Ibn Taimīya that would justify violent action against one's own ruler. This may have to do with the Damascene scholar's political quietism, which led him to side with the Mamlūks in power. It seems to me, quite to the opposite of received wisdom, that the hallmark theme connected with Ibn Taimīya in al-ʿUmda is precisely his staunch support even for less-than-ideal models of authority. When we do encounter ǧihād-related topics they refer to the obligation in general terms only and are not directed against pseudo-Muslim governments in any particular sense.
Ibn Qudāma
The scholar Dr who was regarded as the head of the Ḥanbalī school in Damascus from the year 600/1203 onwards, even though he did not hold any official position in the state.
139
Ibn Qudāma is represented 44 times in al-ʿUmda. Dr. Faḍl mainly cites from his comparative law compendium al-Muġnī, focusing primarily on volume ten which consists of the Kitāb al-Ǧihād. Ibn Qudāma serves as Dr. Faḍl's main authority when it comes to advancing positions that seemingly all schools of law share. It is universally agreed, for example, that the absence of an universal Islamic ruler shall not delay waging ǧihād 140 and-these being his most often repeated rulings-under which conditions ǧihād becomes a farḍ ʿain, an individual obligation.
141
In this vein, Ibn Qudāma is quoted by Dr. Faḍl to evaluate the status of an immoral (fāǧir) leader 142 and to explore the question of who has the right to set up juridical authority. 143 Ibn Qudāma is also one of the few scholars who are consulted by Dr. Faḍl when he deems it necessary to record disagreements among earlier authorities like the extent of the permissible reliance on polytheists (mušrikūn) in battle. 144 As the character of al-Muġnī might already suggest, Ibn Qudāma provides Dr. Faḍl with quite uncontroversial, essential information on classical conceptions of ǧihād, the only exception being Ibn Qudāma's approval of setting up judicial institutions independently of state authority.
Ibn Qaiyim al-Ǧauzīya
Ibn Qaiyim al-Ǧauzīya
145
(d. 751/1350) usually appears in the secondary literature as a figure similar to Ibn Qudāma: he is perceived as a rather passive transmitter of tradition. Yet, in Ibn al-Qaiyim's case, this means an even more limited kind of "school", namely the legacy of his master Ibn Taimīya. Ibn al-Qaiyim had studied with him since 712/1313 and remained a faithful disciple, even following Ibn Taimīya into prison. 146 Dr. Faḍl cites Ibn al-Qaiyim to marshal arguments mainly in two fields: the first is represented by his quotations from Iʿlām almuwaqqiʿīn ʿan rabb al-ʿālamīn (Instructing Those in Charge about the Lord of the Worlds). This work of legal methodology was devised originally as a guide devoted to the correct behavior, consistent with the sources of law, for the muftī and the questioner (mustaftī). Yet, it developed into an encompassing compendium, which "ranks among a distinguished group of about half a dozen u · sūl al-fiqh monographs that represent the best and most important contributions to the field". "Ṣūfī-Ḥanbalite". 148 The most often cited work in this context is his Iġāṯat al-lahfān min maṣāyid aš-šaiṭān (Rescuing the Distressed from Satan's Snares), which deals with advice on challenges and temptations the believer has to face in everyday life.
149
Ibn al-Qaiyim is mainly quoted by Dr. Faḍl to discuss questions of juridical hermeneutics, such as that the correct interpretation can even be limited to one person, 150 or that the basic problem of fitna is always connected to the preference for opinion over revelation. 151 To overcome this issue, one must hand the decision back to God, 152 disregard school extremism 153 and appoint muftīs and judges who are well versed in worldly matters so that they can adjust their fatwās to changing circumstances.
154
Secondly, Ibn Qaiyim al-Ǧauzīya stands in Dr. Faḍl's work for a very reciprocal view on the Creator: God not only exclusively helps those who believe, 155 He also does not care about the sinner if the latter pays no attention to Him. 156 It is therefore necessary to repel the bad with the good and to shun the easiness of a comfortable life.
157 Joseph Norment Bell has pointed out that Ibn al-Qaiyim's love theory does not go beyond a legalistic reward scheme for righteousness, which he calls the "nomos-tradition" in the Ḥanbalī school. 158 Overall, Ibn al-Qaiyim does not simply appear as an appendix to Ibn Taimīya since the topics he covers are essentially different from the politics/ǧihād debates raised by his teacher.
Abū Yaʿlā
Overshadowed not so much by his teacher but rather by his Šāfiʿī contemporary al-Māwardī, Muḥammad b. al-Farrāʾ (d. 458/1066) is more widely known by his kunya as Abū Yaʿlā. Dr. Faḍl cites exclusively from his al-Aḥkām as-sulṭānīya (The Ordinances of Government) in which Abū Yaʿlā develops a theory of the state in times of crisis and fleshes out rules pertaining to government.
159
Dr. Faḍl infers from his writings that the people may choose judges for themselves if there is no Islamic ruler (imām) available 160 and that polytheists (mušrikūn) may not be employed in sensitive positions of the state. 161 Most importantly, however, Abū Yaʿlā is consulted by Dr. Faḍl to make room for his conception of the pledge of allegiance (baiʿa), a key idea in his arguments about legitimizing alternative structures of political authority: drawing on a quote by Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, Abū Yaʿlā obliges the Muslim community to give baiʿa to an usurper of power.
162
Common people do not even need to know the identity of the person to whom they extend baiʿa, 163 while a pledge once made does not become invalid if a better suited candidate for the imamate should arrive on the scene.
164
To give a preliminary conclusion: even though Dr. Faḍl explicitly singles out the ḥanbalīya for their welcoming stance on iǧtihād, 165 this praise does not lead to a greater reliance on authors who align them-selves with this school. Ibn Taimīya is of course the notable and prominent exception to this argument. Dr. Faḍl draws on him not so much as an ideologue of overthrowing unbelieving rulers, but rather as a general propagator of ǧihād and, more importantly, as a political thinker. Yet, there is no obvious reason why Dr. Faḍl would have been required to rely on Ibn Qudāma. He could very well have extracted rather similar quotes on the essentials of ǧihād from the fiqh compendia of other schools.
166 Despite the fact that Abū Yaʿlā plays an important role for Dr. Faḍl's political vision through providing a justification for the use of baiʿa by ǧihādī groups, one gets the impression that he is merely cited to complete the picture, not to replace al-Māwardī. 167 Dr. Faḍl is thus in no particular way wedded exclusively to the Ḥanbalī school which also becomes apparent as far as later Wahhābī thought is concerned. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb features only as a minor authority in al-ʿUmda. 168 Dr. Faḍl never declares the perfect commitment to a double form of tauḥīd, which draws together rubūbīya (lordship) and ulūhīya (worship) and was popularized by Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, to be the decisive criterion deciding over admittance to the Muslim fold. Instead, he subscribes to a much less moralist and rigid approach, especially as far as political and military leaders are concerned. tions, namely 39, deal with questions of political authority.
Non-Ḥanbalī Authorities
Ibn Ḥaǧar al-ʿAsqalānī
170 Under this slogan, one may subsume passages which are embedded into an argument about the obligation of the imām to consult other wielders of power, the necessity of obedience towards him, discussions of his conduct and how to organize religious education as well as the rights of the members of the umma (or, in Dr. Faḍl's context: the brothers of the camp) towards him. Secondly, we encounter about 22 quotations that establish the necessity of political organization per se and elaborate how structures of authority are set up. Ibn Ḥaǧar, for example, refers to the essential role of political rule when he remarks that people in general subscribe to the religion of their kings (an-nās ʿalā dīn mulūkihim). The mechanisms to create a political system are identified in the characteristics of baiʿa and its permissibility. In the context of epistemology, Dr. Faḍl draws heavily on Ibn Haǧar as well in order to define proper ways of juridical reasoning and to determine the characteristics of knowledge each individual believer has to possess (about 22 times).
171 Yet, quotations pertaining to the obligation to perform ǧihād are rather rare. Dr. Faḍl relies on Ibn Ḥaǧar in this regard only insofar as he adduces his explanation of the ḥadīṯ that ǧihād might be waged with the hand, the tongue, the heart or financial means.
172
Additionally, he infers from his discussion an universal obligation 173 for holy war and the prescription of fighting for Muslims until judgment day. 174 The trend of focusing on concrete political issues and the crucial question of authority, which manifested itself in the earlier discussion on Ibn Taimīya, continues, therefore, with Ibn Ḥaǧar.
170)
There are also instances when Ibn Ḥaǧar as an independent authority disappears altogether, especially when Dr. Faḍl draws on him as an authority of ḥadīṯ. See, for example, al-ʿUmda, 238-241.
171)
Compare for a detailed listing of all these quotations, Fuchs, Proper Signposts, 91-94.
172)
This ḥadīṯ should not be confused with its more famous parallel that is often adduced in the context of "commanding right and forbidding wrong". See Michael A. Cook 
Ibn Kaṯīr
Among the non-Ḥanbalī authors who are quoted by Dr. Faḍl, the Šāfiʿī Ismāʿīl b. Kaṯīr (d. 774/1373) comes in second. This might be expected since he is commonly listed as a disciple of Ibn Taimīya who put his master's theory of tafsīr into practice, 175 writing a commentary on the Qurʾān which is "marked by little respect for the intellectual tradition of Islam as expressed in the literature of tafsīr, or indeed in any of the scholastic disciplines". 176 Yet, al-ʿUmda refers to this tafsīr only six times. 177 We find, in contrast, 41 quotes from Ibn Kaṯīr's al-Bidāya wan-nihāya (The Beginning and the End), his main historical work, 27 of which deal with the rather narrow topic of different instances of baiʿas. AnNawawī is a pivotal author for Dr. Faḍl because he renders the rebellion against the imām who committed kufr-as distinguished from the imām fāsiq whom the community after initial disputes agreed to bear-as necessary.
182 This quote appears no less than seven times in al-ʿUmda. Additionally, an-Nawawī like Ibn Taimīya widens the definition of "those in authority" (ulū l-amr), stating that they do not only encompass ʿulamāʾ, fuqahāʾ and zuhhād (ascetics) but also šuǧʿān muqātilūn (brave fighters), as well as those who command right and forbid wrong. 
184
He is usually regarded as a pragmatist who was willing to sacrifice the ideal of the caliphate in order to save the unity of the umma, thereby also making room for rule by usurpation -imāma al-ʿuẓmā) . While such an imām might obtain his position through designation, agreement by the ahl al-ḥall wa-l-ʿaqd or even usurpation, 186 there are always several criteria he either has to live up to or obligations he must fulfill.
187 These are, however, predominantly connected to his outward political behavior rather than to his personal morals which one can consider as secondary. 188 Moreover, such a ruler is never bound by the advice the ahl aš-šūrā convey to him. become politically active when no imām is available or when the public order breaks down due to the leader's lack of actual power. Dr. Faḍl adds that in such a case al-Ǧuwainī reserves a special role for the ʿulamāʾ who form the emergency administration and government (wulāt al-ʿubād).
192
Al-Ǧuwainī constitutes also a valuable resource for Dr. Faḍl from which to extract statements which underline the imām's freedom in making decisions. 193 The baiʿa to this leader remains valid even if he fails to display perfect morals. It proves much more salient for al-Ǧuwainī that the imām is able to demonstrate his efficiency (kifāya).
194 Even though al-Ǧuwainī is not cited as often as al-Māwardī or Abū Yaʿlā, his attempt of "secularizing the supreme leader of the Muslims" and reducing him to the daily affairs of politics 195 earns him a place as a solely political thinker in al-ʿUmda. Dr. Faḍl applies these loosened criteria not to the imām, however, but to the commander in the camp (amīr al-muʿaskar).
Abū Muḥammad ʿAlī b. Ḥazm
The last ʿālim to consider is a rather intriguing case. The Andalusian ẓāhirī scholar Abū Muḥammad ʿAlī b. Ḥazm (d. 456/1064) was undoubtedly one of the strongest advocates to fight the ruler for the slightest injustice committed.
196 Yet, this current of his thought is completely absent from Dr. Faḍl's reading. He quotes from Ibn Ḥazm's treatise on law, the Kitāb al-Muḥallā, mainly passages which deal with patience towards the morally inferior, drawing the already familiar line between fisq and nifāq on the one hand and kufr on the other. Ibn Ḥazm declares, for example, that no sin is greater after kufr itself than banning someone from taking part in the ǧihād against the kuffār.
197 Dr. Faḍl is thus clearly not in principle averse to referring to Ibn Ḥazm. The latter's attempts to accommodate Greek logic into Islamic legal theory or his total rejection of qiyās do not turn him into an outsider, unlike al-Ġazālī, for instance. 198 One might ask, however, whether our author nevertheless displays a certain reluctance to rely too heavily on an ʿālim who in Michael Cook's terms might be described as "a law to himself".
199
His idiosyncrasies may be one of the reasons why Dr. Faḍl refrained from incorporating Ibn Ḥazm's theory of rebellion into his work.
Reconstructing the Camp, the World
As we have seen, Dr. Faḍl does not restrict himself in al-ʿUmda to the ḥanbalīya as a school of law. Rather, he aims at relying for his argument on a wide range of medieval authors, hoping thereby to present a convincing scholarly consensus (ǧumhūr al-ʿulamāʾ), as he puts it himself. 200 Dr. Faḍl is not willing to settle with just any scholar who could be useful in advancing his points of view. He deliberately surrounds himself with very prominent ʿulamāʾ, mainly from the field of ḥadīṯ like anNawawī or Ibn Ḥaǧar, in addition to the leading classical theorists of the state. Especially the latter prove valuable for him due to their deliberate ambiguity. Patricia Crone holds that they never spelled out in detail the procedures for removing a ruler because the Sunnis wanted to have their cake and eat it. There had to be a point where even a quasi-caliph (not to mention a mere king) forfeited his position, but it was best not to specify where and how, so as not to create an obligation to take action.
201
Due to these unclear requirements, it proves fairly easy for Dr. Faḍl to step in the void and to fill it with his own ideas of an Islamic state. Building on al-Māwardī, al-Ǧuwainī and Ibn Taimīya, he argues that any political order, provided that it exerts authority, might in the current situation be equally acceptable. This makes room for the leader of a military camp, who becomes eligible not only to head the ǧihād efforts of his group, but also to demand the absolute obedience of his fighters. Quite conveniently, he is no "full" imām and, therefore, does not have to meet qualifications of religious knowledge (ʿilm) or moral criteria. He can at the same time wield far-reaching authority as a result of the binding covenant into which the muǧāhidūn in the camp had entered voluntarily. Their oath placed their personal freedom within the discretionary powers of the amīr al-muʿaskar who can, for this reason, go beyond the šarīʿa-based privileges and duties of the al-imāma al-ʿuẓmā and determine even the smallest details of everyday life.
202
How can Dr. Faḍl justify such extraordinary competences? He bases his argument on two main claims. For one, he offers a detailed discussion of baiʿa, backed up by concrete examples drawn from Ibn Kaṯīr, to show that the pledge of allegiance was in the salaf 's understanding neither the prerogative of the Caliph nor of the official leader of the army. Second, by inter alia adducing Ibn Taimīya's evaluation of the travel-ḥadīṯ as urging Muslims to set up a political structure if they number three individuals or more, Dr. Faḍl attempts to establish the community's competence for choosing a leader when a proper Islamic ruler is absent. By giving classical Sunni thought a distinctive twist, Dr. Faḍl makes it clear, however, that such a right cannot be claimed by simply any group. Rather, he distills a clear-cut ratio legis (ʿilla) from a second central ḥadīṯ which deals with the battle of Muʾta, namely, that a segment of society sets out for a common work-or more precisely for ǧihād-without a leader. From this follows that only a group which actually aims at putting the affairs of religion (al-qiyām bi-umūr ad-dīn) first has the right to choose a commander when no imām is available.
203 This line of argument seems to be Dr. Faḍl's own creative contribution. He at least does not cite any other authority to support this inference even though he conveys the impression that he only builds on Ibn Taimīya who merely rejects the identity of the ṭāʿifa manṣūra, which would be this militant 202) Al-ʿUmda, [139] [140] [141] [142] [143] [144] . One of the anonymous reviewers suggested that such far-reaching functional authority might simply be the privilege of any military leader since on the battlefield a different logic applies than at the ballot-box. While I think this is a valid point, I am more concerned with the way Dr. Faḍl argues for such a position, drawing on the Sunni tradition. 203) Al-ʿUmda, 73. activist group in Dr. Faḍl's reading, with al-firqa an-nāǧiya, the general (Sunni) Muslim population (ahl as-sunnā wa-l-ǧamāʿa). 204 Dr. Faḍl wants to draw such a definite distinction between the two in order to demonstrate the need for an effective, albeit possibly (religiously) unlettered vanguard.
Having taken this detour to baiʿa and the permissibility of independent political action on legal grounds, we should briefly consider the kind of body politic that Dr. Faḍl envisions, both in a short-term and long-term perspective. He does not comment on the actual process during which ṭāʿifa manṣūra groups were set up in Egypt or Afghanistan, but rather pays particular attention to the outcome of such endeavors: the phenomenon of the camp. This nucleus of a later Islamic state is a place of spiritual preparation and helps to firmly plant basic truths into the heart of the muǧāhid. As we have seen, the religious bar for a leader is not raised high in al-ʿUmda. Long passages of the work are devoted to the question whether fighting under an amīr fāǧir is permissible. Dr. Faḍl always answers in the affirmative and emphasizes his support for sub-standard leaders as long as they are militarily able. He even goes as far as to claim that a leader's personal sins, committed in private, would not affect the community as a whole. This stands in stark contrast to all other members of the camp who are connected by a mysterious bond to one another and to God: every hidden, individual lapse hampers the progress of all.
205 Even if the ruler treats his subjects unjustly, withholds their rights and usurps their property, he has to be borne. 206 Dr. Faḍl derives this view on leadership from the experience of the umma: as a reaction to the many intra-Muslim wars (fitan) in early Islam, the ʿulamāʾ agreed to express patience with a leader and to endure his rule. Dr injustices, but not fallen into unbelief itself. 208 In this context, Dr. Faḍl does not pick up Ibn Taimīya's anti-Mongol fatwās in order to support his claims. He only mentions these legal opinions in passing, defending their application to the current unbelieving rulers against the arguments that the Mongols were foreigners. In fact, Dr. Faḍl is eager to extend the scope of his argument beyond Ibn Taimīya. He relies for the important equation of kufr with Western laws on a group of modern authors to which I have referred elsewhere as "four modern rejectionists". This search for alternative authorities might have to do with the harsh opposition al-Farīḍa al-ġāʾiba met in the writings of the Egyptian scholarly establishment. 209 Additionally, Ibn Taimīya quite surprisingly does not take the lead in Dr. Faḍl's plea for an armed upheaval. Instead he serves the author of al-ʿUmda as a tool to present himself as a cautious, soberminded middle-of-the-road thinker: Dr. Faḍl molds, for instance, his own approach of addressing the ruler's faults along the lines of Ibn Taimīya's position, according to which Islam constitutes the happy mean between the ḫawāriǧ and the murǧiʾa, being neither too rash nor too lenient in tackling open sin by those in power. 210 Dr. Faḍl is likewise seemingly moderate in spelling out the consequences of disobedience in the camp and among Islamist/ǧihādī groups after a pledge of allegiance was given. He treads a fine line here, trying to convey that he does not intend to encroach on rights which are the Caliph's prerogative. While constituting a sin, disobedience towards the amīr al-muʿaskar does not mean that one parts way with the Muslim community as a whole or could be called an unbeliever. In fact, every Islamic group that sets itself and its authority as absolute is branded as ḫawāriǧ by Dr.
Faḍl,
211 following Ibn Ḥaǧar's distinction between unbelief and sin (kufr/maʿṣiya). 212 Dr. Faḍl is thus willing to compromise on the Islamic state for now. Yet, ultimately the camp should be replaced by a state which is led by an imām and two assemblies which together form the ahl al-ḥall wa-lʿaqd. Dr. Faḍl's only textual source for such views is a ḥadīṯ which narrates how the caliph ʿUmar b. al-Ḫaṭṭāb consulted with various groups when faced with the news that the plague had broken out in Syria. ʿUmar first solicited the opinion of the emigrants (muhāǧirūn) and the early converts among the Medinese helpers (auwalū l-anṣār). Taken together, both groups represent for Dr. Faḍl the ahl al-faḍl fī l-ʿilm wa-d-dīn (the people of superiority in matters of knowledge and religion). When they failed to provide him with a decisive answer, however, ʿUmar turned in a second step to the elders of Quraiš (mašaiḫat quraiš) whom Dr. Faḍl labels ahl al-ḫibra wa-t-taǧārib (people of experience).
213
We are safe to assume, as Roswitha Badry has shown, that the twochamber model which Dr. Faḍl extrapolates from this ḥadīṯ is only a variant of the standard type which had gained popularity among Islamist circles of his time.
214
The first chamber, the Assembly of Experts (maǧlis al-ḫubarāʾ), requires specialists in religious and worldly matters who for Dr. Faḍl have to be ʿulamāʾ, handpicked by the imām. The ruler is obliged to consult with them in matters of iǧtihād, e.g. questions that are not settled by a decisive, šarīʿa-based ruling. The deputies of the second chamber, the Assembly of Deputies (maǧlis an-nuqabāʾ), are in contrast more technocrats who can furnish information for the imām on the country's situation. Dr. Faḍl claims that this chamber bears some similarities to a parliament in a western-style democracy. Yet, important qualifications apply: only righteous and pious persons can serve in this 211) Al-ʿUmda, 148. He argues that the process works precisely the other way round: if one becomes an unbeliever, this step entails leaving the community also. 215 In a similar vein, Dr. Faḍl emphasizes the existence of a gray area of worldly matters acknowledged by the Prophet. He refers to Muḥammad's comments on the pollination of dates, a field in which others have broader knowledge than he himself. Dr. Faḍl is quick to assert, however, that acknowledgment of an area of secular deliberations does not mean that, for example, the necessities of the modern banking sector could justify usury (ribā).
216
As far as the ruler's competences are concerned, Dr. Faḍl comes to rather similar conclusions as in the case of the amīr al-muʿaskar. There is no obligation for the imām to stick to the advice he has received from any institution. The šūrā-body shall not constrain his absolute powers. Al-Ǧuwainī, Ibn Ḥaǧar, an-Nawawī, Ibn Taimīya and Ibn al-Qaiyim all regard consultation as merely recommended. 217 Dr. Faḍl combines at this stage the classical Sunni theory of šūrā as being primarily an assembly to choose a ruler's successor with his own, modern understanding and envisioned institutions. 218 Since he is aware of their constantly endangered character (e.g. by an unjust imām), I would argue that he does not fall into the trap which Patricia Crone sees at play when the direct rule by God (ḥākimīya) is postulated by Islamist writers. According to Crone, such an approach would constitute an "abhorrent idea" to religious scholars of the middle period because this argument would contain the tacit assumption that God could only manifest his will through the state.
219
Conclusion: Negotiating the Tradition
In summary, we have seen that Dr. Faḍl is careful not to openly break with the Islamic scholarly tradition when he spells out his personal take on political authority. He rather constantly aims at weaving respected ʿulamāʾ into his line of argument in al-ʿUmda, unfurling a whole panorama of Sunni thought during his discussion of obedience. Dr. Faḍl is especially careful to convey to his readers that he is only covering the safe ground of iǧmāʾ even when he treads on more slippery slopes. Quoting initially aš-Šaukānī's interpretation of the travel-ḥadīṯ, Dr. Faḍl gradually and in a hardly noticeable manner transforms the argument and reaches conclusions about political self-help and armed resistance to "nominal" Muslim authorities. Such moves may not necessarily push the tradition into entirely new directions but they clearly shift the focus to a (powerful) minority stream of Sunni thought. In this context, Dr. Faḍl also deliberately makes use of ambiguities the medieval accounts on public law display, picking up on issues of fragmentation of authority, collapse of existing structures and the careful debates of the jurists whether one could depose an imām who threatens the core of religion. His approach does not in principle, though, differ from al-Māwardī's concept of law "as a body of flexible doctrines that can be altered when historical circumstances warrant such an adjustment". the tradition. To be sure, he usually offers one decisive reading, not a plurality of options his audience can choose from. While this is due to al-ʿUmda's character as a rough-and-ready guide to ǧihād for members of the camp, it also leads to the broader question if such an exclusivist stance automatically casts him out of the broader Sunni scholarly fold.
If we turn to Ibn Taimīya more specifically, it has become apparent that al-ʿUmda is not exclusively based on the thought of the Damascene scholar. Dr. Faḍl, while undoubtedly extracting general exhortations on the importance of ǧihād from Ibn Taimīya, relies on him as a decidedly political thinker and a propagator of consultation, reading him mostly as an advocate of political quietism and submission to the camp-authorities despite their moral shortcomings. Overthrowing the tyrants of the Muslim world lingers in the background, but Dr. Faḍl is careful to build upon the writings of other medieval and modern authors to demonstrate its legitimacy. It remains to be seen which broader conclusions for the study of radical Islam can be drawn from these observations. Intellectual trajectories are notoriously difficult to delineate or to explain. We might speculate that Dr. Faḍl was careful not to associate his book too closely with al-Farīḍa al-ġāʾiba, but more research on the scholarly environment in the Afghan ǧihādī camps appears to be necessary to answer this question decisively. Al-ʿUmda cautions us at least to refrain from sweeping claims about the ideational origins of radical Islam. Narrow, clear-cut paths of reception in the vein of Ibn Taimīya/Ibn ʿAbd alWahhāb/Saiyid Quṭb do not hold up to closer scrutiny. Dr. Faḍl's treatise demonstrates that instead we have to pay particular attention to the often not so obvious twists and reformulations of the wider Islamic tradition. These constitute the crucial spots which ultimately have important bearings on the credibility ǧihādī thinkers can claim for their interpretation of the Islamic heritage as a whole.
